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PLEADING SECURITIES FRAUD
RICHARD G. HIMELRICK*
Through their pleadings the parties to a lawsuit give notice of the
claims and defenses to be advanced. Borrowing from Wigmore, Roscoe
Pound warned that except to the extent they serve a notice function, the
pleadings are only "instruments of stratagem to the bar and logical ex-
cercitation to the judiciary."' His point was well made. If the pleadings
are confined to a notice function, then responsive pleadings can accom-
plish little by disputing the sufficiency of an adversary's allegations. But
if pleadings are assigned more importance, perhaps with the thought of
narrowing the triable issues and thwarting improbable claims, their for-
mality inevitably increases, enhancing the possibility of errant drafts-
manship. With added importance and formality, the opportunities for
pleading stratagems multiply.
The federal rules strive to minimize objections to the form of plead-
ings and to ensure that deficiencies in draftsmanship are not dispositive.
They emphasize simplicity and brevity of statement. Rule 8 states the
general principles. It provides for a short and plain statement of a
party's claim,2 including simple, concise, and direct averments. No
technical form of pleading is required.4 Instead, "pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice."5 It is envisioned that the matters
at issue between the parties will develop through discovery and pretrial
motion practice. A party need not detail the facts upon which his claim
is based.6 Thus, the pleadings serve merely to provide a general state-
ment of claims that may undergo substantial revision as the lawsuit
unfolds.
In many courts all of this gives way when allegations of fraud are
made. Rule 9(b) obligates the pleader to present with particularity the
circumstances underlying a claim of fraud.7 Relying on this rule, courts
* Hart & Himelrick, Phoenix Arizona; B.A. Oakland University, 1971; J.D. Wayne
State University, 1974.
1. Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 491, 495 (1910) (quoting J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at 79 (1st ed. 1904)).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
3. Id. 8(e)(1).
4. Id.
5. Id. 8(o.
6. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) reads:
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mis-
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have insisted upon pleading formalities and details entirely foreign to
other claims.
Far and away, rule 9(b) has been most vigorously enforced in secur-
ities litigation, where it is seen in many quarters as an expeditious device
for clearing baseless fraud claims from court calendars. By virtue of the
enforcement given rule 9(b), only those plaintiffs who are prepared to
detail the manner in which each defendant has committed or partici-
pated in an act of fraud are entitled to proceed.' In addition, courts
have established rigid requirements concerning pleading the defendant's
duty,9 scienter,'0 primary and secondary liability,"1 and other matters.12
If the defense challenges the pleading's particularity, courts frequently
stay discovery until satisfied that the fraud claim is sufficiently specific. 3
The result is a modern form of technical pleading that one would have
thought the federal rules consigned to another era.
In securities litigation, insistence upon detailed pleading coincides
with substantive efforts, including conspicuous examples in the Supreme
Court, to control the expansion of rule 10b-5. The number of transac-
tions subject to the securities laws is, at least to the uninitiated, surpris-
ingly broad. Partnerships,' 4 franchises,' 5 trust deeds,' 6 condominiums, "
pension plans,' 8 and promissory notes' 9 have all on occasion been found
to constitute securities. A falsehood, half truth, omission, or deceptive
act in connection with the purchase or sale of any of these may provide
the predicate for a 10b-5 claim.2" The fraud complained of must be
take shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condi-
tion of mind of a person may be averred generally.
8. See in/ta text accompanying notes 103-17.
9. See sn/fa text accompanying notes 91-95.
10. See infa text accompanying notes 135-53.
11. See in/ta text accompanying notes 104 & 129-34.
12. See zn/ja text accompanying notes 154-65.
13. See zn)fa text accompanying note 195.
14. E.g., Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,863 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1982).
15. E.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 652, 485 P.2d 108, 111 (1971).
16. Eg., Los Angeles Trust Deed and Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 166-72 (9th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
17. E.g., Wooldridge Homes, Inc. v. Bronze Tree, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1085, 1088 (D. Colo.
1983).
18. E.g., Diasonics, Inc., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 77,354
(Dec. 29, 1982).
19. E.g., SEC v. Diversified Indus., 465 F. Supp. 104,107 (D.D.C. 1979) (purchase money
mortgage note is a security).
20. The federal securities laws apply only where an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce is involved. Rule 10b-5, for example, speaks in terms of fraud perpetrated "by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange." In practice, satisfying this requirement is a modest bur-
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material, but common law requirements of reliance and causation are
frequently presumed in the plaintiffs favor. Any misrepresentation can
be restated as an omission, 21 and most experienced practitioners elect to
structure their case as involving nondisclosure. 22 If the theory is nondis-
closure, definite proof of reliance is not required: The "obligation to
disclose and [the] withholding of a material fact establish the requisite
element of causation in fact." 2 Hence, if the transaction involves a se-
curity and the plaintiff can postulate some arguably significant fact that
was not succinctly brought to his attention, he has the makings of a 10b-
5 claim. Moreover, the class of potential defendants is broad; virtually
anyone having a significant connection to the purchase or sale is a po-
tential defendant. Privity-direct dealings between plaintiff and de-
fendant-is not required.24  In addition, the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the "controlling persons" statutes, and theories of aiding and
abetting and conspiracy subject many others to liability on the basis of
status or conduct that is secondary to the primary wrong.
25
The burgeoning growth of 10b-5 litigation was acknowledged by
the Supreme Court in 1975. Characterizing the 1Ob-5 action as "a judi-
cial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn," the
Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,2 6 concluded that such
litigation "presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and
kind than that which accompanies litigation in general. ' 27 Concerned
with the ease of invoking the securities laws, the Court imposed a stand-
ing requirement, limiting 10b-5 actions to plaintiffs who actually
purchase or sell a security.2 8
den. Proof of an intrastate telephone call in connection with the fraud will suffice. Eg.,
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 873-74 (10th Cir. 1982).
21. Little v. First Cal. Co., 532 F.2d 1302, 1304 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976) ("All misrepresenta-
tions are also nondisclosures, at least to the extent that there is a failure to disclose which facts
in the representation are not true."); Crane, An Analvsis of Causation under Rule 10b-5, 9 SEC.
REG. LJ. 99, 103 (1981).
22. See generally Helman, Rule lOb-5 Omissions Cases and the Investment Decision, 51 FORDHAM
L. REV. 399 (1982).
23. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153, reh'g denied, 407 U.S. 916
(1972).
24. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745, reh 'g denied, 423 U.S. 884
(1975). ("[P]rivity of dealing or even personal contact between potential defendant and po-
tential plaintiff is the exception and not the rule.").
25. See authorities cited infra note 103.
26. 421 U.S. 723, 737, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
27. Id. at 739.
28. Id. at 730-31. Before Blue Chip, there were cases concluding that even those who did
not purchase or sell, but merely failed to take advantage of an opportunity to buy or sell, or
who had indirect involvement in a purchase or sale, could sue under rule lOb-5. See, e.g.,
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S.
[VOL. 43:342
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Blue Chip was followed by other decisions narrowing the reach of
rule lOb-5. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,29 by far the most significant
decision, the court imposed a scienter requirement. This was followed
by decisions restricting the use of rule lOb-5 as a remedy for breaches of
fiduciary duty by corporate management 3" and confining omissions
cases to those where the defendant has a duty to disclose.3"
As the reach of rule l0b-5 has been quartered, particularized plead-
ing has insured that plaintiffs take cognizance of the elements of a lOb-5
claim from the start. Loose pleading cannot obscure the absence of sci-
enter, 2 a duty of disclosure,33 or some other element of the claim if the
pleader is required to plead a basis for each element.
This article will analyze the law regarding pleading securities
fraud. In the first section it will briefly discuss the history of the require-
ment of special particularity. With a view towards illuminating practi-
cal problems, the second section critically surveys the rules that have
developed in those courts advancing a strict approach to pleading fraud.
The final portion of the article argues that the particularity requirement
inefficiently serves its underlying purposes, impedes the litigation of le-
gitimate claims, and fails to comport with the policy and structure of the
federal rules. It concludes that the assessment of sanctions under rule
11, rather than the enforcement of strict pleading, is an appropriate
means of deterring vexatious securities litigation.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RULE 9(b)
The common law, despite its formality, allowed considerable gener-
ality in stating a party's claim.3 4 In fact, one of the criticisms of com-
mon law pleading was that the vague, conclusory allegations permitted
in many of the forms of action deprived the opposing party of fair no-
tice.35 But averments of fraud constituted an exception to the rule of
generalized pleading. As a consequence of the seriousness of a fraud
charge and of its effect on reputations, these claims were said to be disfa-
723 (1975); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1973), cerl.
denied, 416 U.S. 960, reh'g denied, 420 U.S. 967 (1974).
29. 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
30. See Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977).
31. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
32. See inftra notes 135-53 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
34. See 2A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTICE 8.03, at 8-22 (2d ed.
1981); Cook, "Fats" and "Statements of Fat," 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 234 (1937). The detail
required would of course vary according to the form of action. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 63-64 (2d ed. 1977).
35. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 422-423
(1921).
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vored and sustainable only if pled with factually specific allegations.3 6
Common law pleading began to disappear when, in 1848, New
York enacted an "[aict to simplify and abridge the Practice, Pleadings,
and Proceedings of the Courts."3 7 Popularly called the Field Code after
David Dudley Field, its primary sponsor and draftsman, it provided the
impetus for procedural reform and similar code enactments in much of
the country. A significant reform under the Field Code and its progeny
was the abolition of the common law forms of action.3 8 In their place,
the codes directed pleaders to provide a plain and concise statement of
the facts upon which the cause of action was based. Despite the interest
in attaining clear, succinct pleadings, the requirement of particularity in
alleging fraud was continued under the codes.3 9
The federal rules discarded the code practice of pleading "facts"
and imposed a simplified approach to pleading. The new requirement,
adopted in 1938, was that the pleader make only a short and plain state-
36. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 48, at 311-13 & § 97, at
617 (2d ed. 1947); B. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING § 97 (3d ed. 1923).
An early case, J'Anson v. Stuart, 99 Eng. Rep. 1357 (K.B. 1787), aptly conveys the
common law approach to pleading fraud. The plaintiff brought suit for libel on the basis of a
newspaper article that accused him of being a swindler. The defendant answered with a plea
that plaintiff was one of a "gang of... swindlers and common informers" who were "guilty
of deceiving and defrauding divers persons." Id. Plaintiff demurred on the grounds that the
defendant's plea was too vague. The court agreed:
The first question then here is, whether the defendant is at liberty to charge the
plaintiff with swindling, without shewing any instances of it? That is contrary to
every rule of pleading; for wherever one person charges another with fraud, he must
know the particular instances on which his charge is founded, and therefore ought
to disclose them. . . . Now in the present case, if this plea were to be suffered, it
would be to allow any person to libel another more on the records of the Court than
he could do in a public newspaper. If the plaintiff has been guilty of any acts of
swindling, the defendant must be taken to know them. . . . [K]nowing them he
ought to put them on the record that plaintiff might be prepared to answer them.
Id.
Three concerns are detectable in this reasoning. The court is concerned that the de-
fendant's reputation not be unfairly tarnished; that he be given fair notice so that he can
prepare to meet the charge; and that he not be subjected to the unfounded claims that might
be made if the pleader were not required to disclose the "particular instances on which his
charge is founded." These concerns are common themes in contemporary decisions favoring
a strict approach to pleading fraud. See b'fa text accompanying notes 174-81.
37. 1848 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 379, cited in L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 340
(1973). The origin and impact of the Field Code is succinctly recounted in id. at 340-347.
38. The most significant other reform was the substitution of the "civil action" for sepa-
rate actions at Law and in Equity.
39. C. CLARK, supra note 36, § 48, at 311-12. It is familiar learning that the codes did not
produce simplified pleadings. The codes' emphasis on pleading the facts engendered elusive
distinctions among facts, conclusions, and evidence that all too frequently proved fatal for the
pleader who failed to anticipate the distinctions. See Cook, supra note 35, at 423.
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ment of his claim. This standard generated considerable discussion4"
and some dissent. 4' But the drafters retained the requirement of plead-
ing fraud with specificity without attracting significant comment.4 2 No
one seems to have had serious doubt about continuance of this rule or
whether it squared with other rules of pleading.
The potential significance of rule 9(b) in modern securities litiga-
tion did not arise until 1946, when in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co ., an
implied right of action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 4 4 was
recognized. Interestingly, Kardon also noted that the plaintiff's allega-
40. See, e.g., Edmunds, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 J. MAR. L.Q. 291,
298-301 (1938); Pike, Some Current Trends in the Construction of the Federal Rules, 9 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 26, 27-28 (1940); Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 HARV. L. REV.
169 (1939); Sunderlund, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 10- 13 (1938); see also mater-
ials cited infra note 42.
41. McCaskill, Easy Pleading, 35 ILL. L. REv. 28 (1940); see also McCaskill, The Modern
Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A. J. 123 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as McCaskill, Modern Philosophy of Pleading].
42. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE ABA INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES AT CLEVELAND,
OHIO ON JULY 21-23, 1938, at 234 (W. Dawson ed. 1938); Chestnut, Analysis of Proposed New
Federal Rules of Cvil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 533, 536 (1936); Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 447, 450 (1936).
43. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). The elements of
common law fraud and a lOb-5 claim are not coterminous. 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND
PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5, at § 11-01 (1981). Because of rule 9(b)'s common law heri-
tage, it has occasionally been suggested that the rule applies to a claim under § 10(b) only if
that claim parallels the elements of common law fraud. Eg., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374,
379 n.3 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 275 n.5 (9th Cir. 1961). Most courts,
however, have concluded without qualification that a lOb-5 claim must be pled with particu-
larity. E.g., Gottreich v. San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 866 (9th Cir. 1977); Tomera
v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975).
Several other securities statutes have also been deemed subject to rule 9(b). On the
theory that the statute is directed at fraudulent conduct, claims under § 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982), have been held subject to rule 9(b). E.g.,
Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 418, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Billet v. Storage
Technology Corp., 72 F.R.D. 583, 585-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), allows recovery for fraudulent negligent conduct; it
has been held subject to rule 9(b) when fraud is alleged. Eg., Posner v. Coopers & Lybrand,
92 F.R.D. 765, 770 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'dmem., 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); Kennedy v.
Nicastro, 517 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also Todd v. Oppenheimer & Co., 78
F.R.D. 415, 419 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (9(b) applies to § 12(2) claim when claim is based on
fraud but not otherwise); Billet, 72 F.R.D. at 585 (Rule 9(b) would be inapplicable in an
action under § 11, § 12 or a § 14(a) action based on fraud, because "liability under those
sections may result from negligent conduct, misstatement or omissions."). By contrast, § 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) does not require proof of deception; thus,
such claims may be pled generally. Ross v. Warner, 480 F. Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Billet, 72 F.R.D. at 585; Schoenfeld v. Giant Stores Corp., 62 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Finally, rule 9(b) has been applied to claims under § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). E.g., Bowman v. Hartig, 334 F. Supp. 1323, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The state of mind required under § 17(a) in circuits recognizing a private action is a develop-
ing area of the law. See infra note 136. To the extent § 17(a) is actionable on a negligence
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tions of fraud were too vague to comport with rule 9(b). Defendants
were advised that upon filing a motion for particulars, plaintiffs would
be required to replead.45 Thus the case which expanded plaintiffs' rem-
edies in securities fraud foreshadowed judicial contraction of them by
procedural means.
Rule 9(b) appears not to have played an important role in securi-
ties litigation in the years following Kardon. There are relatively few
reported cases addressing rule 9(b) before 1970, and those cases that de-
cided 9(b) objections against the pleader did not evidence a clear prefer-
ence for strict pleading.' However, in 1972 the Second Circuit decided
Segal v. Gordon,4 a case that signaled a more demanding role for rule
9(b) in securities litigation. Segal was a derivative action, a species of
litigation long haunted by suggestions, both real and imagined, of
"strike suits."4 Drawing on the comments of Professors Wright and
Miller, Judge Moore opined that the need to deter strike suits had "mo-
basis, an argument can be made that the requirements for pleading fraud do not apply. See
Billet, 72 F.R.D. at 585 (9(b) not applicable to statutes not requiring proof of fraud).
45. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 515 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
46. During the twenty-six years between Kardon and Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602 (2d
Cir. 1972), there were eighteen reported decisions concerning the sufficiency of securities
fraud allegations under rule 9(b). Of these, eight were decided in favor of the plaintiff. Car-
roll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. dented, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 275-76 (9th Cir. 1961); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282,
1292 (D. Mass. 1972); Stromillo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 54 F.R.D.
396, 397-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673,
684-85 (N.D. Ind. 1966), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor
Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Miller v. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc., 229 F.
Supp. 33, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 35 F.R.D. 223, 224 (E.D. Pa.
1964).
Ten cases were decided against the pleader. Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
448 F.2d 442, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1971); Kellman v. ICS, Inc., 447 F.2d 1305, 1309-10 (6th Cir.
1971); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787-88 (2d Cir. 1951); Dyer v. Eastern
Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 902 (D. Me. 1971); Maatheson v. White Weld & Co.,
53 F.R.D. 450, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); O'Connor v. GCA Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1246, 1247
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Reiver v. Photo Motion Corp., 325 F. Supp. 214, 215-16 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 773-75 (D. Colo. 1964); Phillips v.
Sherman, 197 F. Supp. 866, 868-69 (N.D.N.Y. 1961); Seward v. Hammond, 8 F.R.D. 457,459
(D. Mass. 1948). The opinion is not clear, but Gilbert v. Clark, 13 F.R.D. 498 (D. Mass.
1952) was probably a securities case; if so, it should be added to the cases in which 9(b)
objections were successful.
47. 467 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. The phrase "strike suit" is broadly used in securities litigation to refer to lawsuits filed
for their nuisance value in obtaining a settlement. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975). Historically the phrase has
been most associated with stockholders' derivative actions that are filed for the primary pur-
pose of obtaining attorney's fees or a private settlement rather than benefitting the corpora-
tion on whose behalf the suit was ostensibly commenced. See Haudek, The Settlement and
Dismissalof Stockholders'Actions - Part 1, 22 Sw. L.J. 767, 768-70 (1968); McLaughlin, Capacity
of Plainti9Stockholder to Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 YALE L.J. 421, 430 (1936).
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tivated the courts to insist on a reasonably high level of specificity."4 9
Specificity was needed to protect "defendants from the harm that comes
to their reputations or to their goodwill when they are charged with
serious wrongdoing."5 Reasoning from those underpinnings, the court
affirmed the district court's dismissal and denied the plaintiff's request
for discovery, penning on its way what was to become an oft-quoted
aphorism: "A complaint alleging fraud should be filed only after a
wrong is reasonably believed to have occurred; it should serve to seek
redress for a wrong, not to find one."5 1 The impact of Segal was swift
and palpable. Decision upon decision in the Second Circuit drew upon
its rationale in resolving 9(b) objections, usually against plaintiffs.5 2
The strict Segal approach to pleading fraud has not spread to ap-
pellate courts outside the Second Circuit. The Tenth Circuit has held
rule 9(b) inapplicable to lOb-5 claims on the theory that while rule 9(b)
is directed at common law fraud, rule lOb-5 is not confined to common
law fraud.53 The Fifth,54 Seventh 5 5 and Ninth Circuits5 6 have produced
49. 467 F.2d at 607.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 607-08.
52. Eg., Segan v. Dreyfus Corp., 513 F.2d 695, 696 (2d Cir. 1975); Felton v. Walston &
Co., 508 F.2d 577, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1974); Seizer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415,
419 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Goodall v. Columbia Ventures, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1324, 1333 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Fire Fly Enters., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
53. See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 n.3 (10th Cir. 1965); Rochambeau v. Brent
Exploration, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 381, 388-89 (D. Colo. 1978); see a/so supra note 44, at 1.
54. McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1980); Dudley v.
Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 308 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858
(1971); Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1967); Massey-Ferguson,
Inc. v. Bent Equip. Co., 283 F.2d 12, 15 (5th Cir. 1960); Kohler v. Jacobs, 138 F.2d 440, 443
(5th Cir. 1943); see also In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F.
Supp. 227, 251 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (noting liberal approach in Fifth Circuit decisions in ac-
cepting "less-than-perfect complaints").
55. Tomera v. Gah, 511 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1975); Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d 694,
697 (7th Cir. 1971); Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1003 (1970); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Krejci, 123 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1941). But
see Duane v. Altenberg, 297 F.2d 515, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1962).
56. Bosse v. Crowell Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602, 611 (9th Cir. 1977); Gottreich v.
San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 866 (9th Cir. 1977); Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476
F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973); see also Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39, 42 (S.D. Cal. 1982)
(noting liberal practice in Ninth Circuit).
A recent case evidencing a contrary approach is SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d
1315 (9th Cir. 1982). Relying on authority from the Second Circuit, the court affirmed an
order dismissing a crossclaim against a defendant bank for failure to make sufficiently specific
allegations of wrongdoing. It held it proper to order dismissal even though the plaintiff had
not had discovery, Id. at 1317. Moreover, without mentioning a seemingly contrary holding
in Walling, 476 F.2d at 397, the court found the complaint deficient for failure to allege a
factual basis demonstrating scienter on the bank's part. 667 F.2d at 1316-17. Although an
apparent deviation from prior Ninth Circuit case law, the decision is perhaps explainable on
the basis that the defendant bank's role in the fraud had not been alleged at all: "Its only
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substantial authority endorsing a simplified approach to pleading fraud
that is similar to the standard of rule 8. There are, of course, cases in
these circuits resolving 9(b) objections against the pleader, but these de-
cisions do not depart from the simplified approach of rule 8. They
merely mark the line between pleadings that reflect an honest attempt
to plead clearly the circumstances of the fraud and those that do not.
An unadorned allegation of fraud, for example, that makes no effort to
describe the circumstances upon which it is premised will not suffice in
these circuits.5 7
Other circuits have not clearly indicated a position, 58 but no appel-
late court enforces rule 9(b) with the enthusiasm prevalent in the Sec-
ond Circuit.5 9 There are cases that if broadly viewed might imply a
strict construction of rule 9(b). On examination, however, these deci-
sions are attributable to some exigency peculiar to the case, such as dila-
toriness in pursuing discovery or in amending.' Thus, on balance
Second Circuit decisions evidence a markedly different approach than
do those of the other circuits.
The restrictive influence of the Second Circuit decisions is wide-
spread in district courts outside that circuit. Although essentially unac-
knowledged at the appellate level,6 1 these district courts are deciding
relationship to the litigation was that it held an agency account for ... one of the principal
defendants." Id. at 1316.
57. E.g., Robison v. Caster, 356 F.2d 924, 925 (7th Cir. 1966) ("bare assertions of a con-
spiracy to defraud" inadequate); Rubens v. Ellis, 202 F.2d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1953) (reference
to "gross misrepresentation and deceit" too conclusory); cf. Schmidt v. Herman, 614 F.2d
1221, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1980) (particularity not a license for prolixity).
58. See, e.g., Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259, 272 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. demed, 439 U.S. 1129
(1978) (cites Segal for particularity but says averments of scienter may be general).
59. Second Circuit decisions evidencing the strict approach include Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 92-94 (2d Cir. 1983); Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 57
(2d Cir. 1982) (emphasizing strict approach of past decisions, court dismissed because allega-
tions too general in light of plaintiff's access to discovery); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd.,
681 F.2d 111, 115-117 (2d Cir. 1982); Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 73 (2d Cir.
1979),cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1978);
see also cases cited supra note 52.
60. See, e.g., United States ex rel Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385-86 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 810 (1981) (plaintiff's allegations were "generalized and vague"; plaintiff
denied leave to amend because he failed to do so for the 11 months between defendant's
motion to dismiss and court's order); Kellman v. ICS, Inc., 447 F.2d 1305, 1310 (6th Cir.
1971) (plaintiff on notice that more details of fraud needed, yet failed to offer details in two
amendments).
61. A few appellate decisions have shown a disinclination to follow Second Circuit prece-
dent. See, e.g., Christidis v. First Pa. Mortgage Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1983)
(indicating reluctance to follow Second Circuit cases denying discovery until a complaint
satisfies rule 9(b)); McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1980)
(declining to follow Second Circuit authority requiring scienter to be pled with particularity).
[VOL. 43:342
PLEADING SECURITIES FRAUD
cases on the basis of Second Circuit decisions.6 2 Occasionally, they go so
far as to distinguish decisions by the appellate court within their own
circuit in favor of Second Circuit precedents.
6 3
Furthermore, appellate decisions have not yet clearly recognized
the difference between the Second Circuit approach and the simple, rule
8 approach.' Instead, they routinely tend to resolve rule 9(b) issues in
the pleader's favor. Detailed opinions involving the dismissal of pa-
tently defective complaints are rarely seen. On the other hand, when
the pleading is sufficient, and the court's decision permissive, its opinion
is often insipid reading of slight precedential value.6 5 Bobby Jones Garden
Apts., Inc. v. Suleski 6 is illustrative. The issue was whether the plaintiff
had adequately pled the defendants' misrepresentations regarding some
air units. In three terse sentences the Fifth Circuit decided the matter in
the plaintiff's favor: "Defendants stated: The air units would heat.
They did not heat. How much more specific can one get?"'6 7 A Ninth
Circuit decision provides a further example. In Gottreich v. San Francisco
Investment Corp.,' defendants contended that the complaint was defi-
cient for failure to describe why certain alleged misrepresentations were
in fact false statements. Essentially, the defendants asked, how could
they know the statements "were false if they were not false?" 6 Perceiv-
ing a superficial objection, the court rebuked defendants with the ad-
monishment that this was "nit-picking" of the type interred by the
federal rules.70
62. E.g., Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1036-37 (D. Minn.
1981); Berman v. Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,857, at 90,
297-298 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 637 (N.D.
Cal. 1980).
63. See McFarland, 493 F. Supp. at 637. In Russo v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 554
F. Supp. 613, 617-18 (N.D. Ill. 1982), the court applied authority in the Seventh Circuit
requiring only a "brief sketch" of fraudulent conduct for part of the claim, but then, citing
Second Circuit cases, proceeded to treat allegations of churning, a specialized form of fraudu-
lent conduct, as requiring greater specificity.
64. But see supra note 61. See also Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal., 1982), in
which the court indicated that in view of the simplified approach to pleading evidenced by
Ninth Circuit cases, it was inappropriate to rely on decisions from other circuits advocating a
strict approach. Id. at 42.
65. This is of course not a necessary result. A pleading approved with a reasoned expla-
nation of its approval can be of substantial benefit in future cases. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957); Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574, 577-80 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see also In
re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 250-56 (W.D.
Tex. 1979) (finding complaint sufficient in some respects but not others).
66. 391 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1968).
67. Id. at 178 n.18.
68. 552 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1977).
69. Id. at 867.
70. Id.
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Cases such as Bobby Jones and Gottreich unmistakably reflect a gener-
ous view of pleading. But their precedential value is narrow. They
might well reflect and be cited as authority for simplified, notice-type
pleading. But just as easily they can be characterized as saying only
that on the facts presented the pleading was adequate.7 1 Ultimately,
therefore, their meaning is left to the trial court's discretion.
On the other hand, restrictive opinions, such as those of the Second
Circuit, that identify rules that have been transgressed are more prone
to control the trial judge's decision. Consider, for example, the Second
Circuit's rule that an allegation that a defendant acted knowingly must
be supported by facts that "give rise to a strong inference" of knowl-
edge.72 This is a rule the pleader must acknowledge in drafting his com-
plaint. The trial court will have discretion to determine what suffices to
show a "strong inference" of knowledge, but not to sanction a bare alle-
gation that the defendant acted knowingly.
II. PLEADING AN ADEQUATE SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIM
With a view to analyzing what must be pled to state a legally suffi-
cient claim, this article turns to the restrictive 9(b) cases, most notably
those from the Southern District of New York. What suffices will of
course vary according to the importance the trial judge attaches to the
pleadings, for despite a plethora of case law, resolving a 9(b) objection is
still essentially a matter of discretion. This section will first discuss types
of securities fraud: misrepresentation, omission, and churning. Then it
will cover pleading particular issues, such as scienter, that may be found
in any or all of these actions. It is intended to convey a sense of the
standard of pleading in courts that favor a strict construction of rule
9(b). What is stated to be a rule in the text may not in a given case be
treated as such. The text sets forth working rules supported by prece-
dent and indicative of what is likely to be required when a court is re-
ceptive to the argument for greater specificity. Although case law is
most prevalent in the Southern District of New York, there is bur-
geoning support for strict construction of the particularity requirement.
A. Misrepresentations
Historically the particularity requirement has been most commonly
enforced in cases involving misstatements. False statements lend them-
71. See McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 637 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (distin-
guishing several other permissive cases on the basis that they "simply concluded that the
complaint being considered had been pleaded with adequate particularity").
72. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denid, 446 U.S. 946
(1980). For a discussion of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
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selves to concrete identification. It is therefore possible to insist upon
fairly precise allegations concerning the nature, time, place, manner,
and author of a misstatement without unfairly burdening the pleader.
This information is typically available to the plaintiff without need for
discovery and is usually not subject to the claim that it is peculiarly
within the defendant's knowledge. For this reason there has been no
substantial resistance to the concept that if the pleader bases his plead-
ing on a misrepresentation he must detail it. Hence the statement al-
leged to be false should be pled with an explanation of why it is false.7 3
A time frame is required: If the plaintiff's purchase or sale commit-
ment preceded any omission, misrepresentation, or other deceptive con-
duct by the defendant, the acts are not in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security.74 Depending upon the circumstances, adequate
notice of the time may be provided by identifying the date of the docu-
ment containing a misstatement and the date or period of its dissemina-
tion75 or the date or period during which any oral misrepresentations
occurred. 7
6
With written misrepresentations the document containing the mis-
statement should be identified.77 In some instances the plaintiff may be
obligated to plead how he received the document. Without this infor-
mation it may be impossible to ascertain whether the plaintiff received
the document in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a secur-
ity, or whether he relied upon it in making his investment decision.7"
Each party's role in the misrepresentation should be identified.
With oral misrepresentations, the person making the misrepresentations
73. Lipton v. Documation, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,788, at 94,041 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 1982); Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F.
Supp. 1028, 1036 (D. Minn. 1981).
74. See Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 891 (2d Cir. 1972); Zatkin
v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39, 43 (S.D. Cal. 1982). See generally Kaminsky, Post-Transaction
Evidence in Securities Litigation, 19 B.C.L. REv. 617, 618 (1978).
75. See Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1978).
76. Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (D. Minn. 1981).
77. Kennedy v. Nicastro, 503 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Ross v. Warner, 480 F.
Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Contra Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(sufficient to identify category of documents containing misstatements); DuPont v. Wyly, 61
F.R.D. 615, 631-32 (D. Del. 1973) (same); see also In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum
Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 252 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (identification of documents by
category sufficient only if factual posture of case indicates this will give defendants fair
notice).
78. See Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (failure to plead how plaintiff relied on misrepresentation); Morgan v. Prudential
Group, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 418, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (failure to plead how alleged misrepresenta-
tions in document presenting tender offer damaged plaintiff); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 68
F.R.D. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (amended complaint should plead "causal nexus").
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should be identified.79 With writings, identification of the person pre-
paring the tainted document is required.8" If the pleading names multi-
ple defendants, it must state the connection between each defendant
and the misstatements.8 " Finally, some indication of what advantage a
defendant received through the misrepresentation may be necessary.8 2
B. Omziswns
Fraud by omission includes cases in which the defendant disclosed
only a portion of what he was required to, as well as those in which he
made no disclosure whatsoever, but should have. The common law im-
poses a duty to disclose the whole truth once a defendant speaks; half-
truths are forbidden.8 3 This principle is codified in a series of securities
statutes interdicting nondisclosure of a ". . .material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading . "..."84 A complaint averring half-
truths should identify the omissions. It should further identify the inclu-
sions that were made misleading and, if not readily apparent, the rea-
sons those statements are misleading.8 5 Specific allegations as to the
time and place that facts were omitted may not be possible if the nondis-
closure was ongoing, but there is no similar impediment regarding mis-
leading statements.8 6
Where there is a complete failure to speak, different issues are
presented. In Chiarella v. United States,8 7 a criminal case, the Supreme
Court concluded that the failure to disclose material information prior
to the consummation of a transaction constitutes fraud only if there is a
duty to disclose.8 8 The court reversed the conviction of Chiarella, a
"markup man" employed by a printing company that printed an-
nouncements of corporate takeovers. Chiarella had deduced the iden-
79. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. at 394; Glickman, Lure, E'ger & Co., 520 F.
Supp. at 1036.
80. Prudential Group, Inc., 81 F.R.D. at 426 (failure to identify author of tender offer).
81. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. at 1036;NAcastro, 503 F. Supp. at 1120-22;see
also infra notes 104-37 and accompanying text.
82. Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,867, at 94,515 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1982); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage
Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1087-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afd, 636 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 696-97 (4th ed. 1971).
84. See Rule lOb-5(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Comparable prohibitions are con-
tained in §§ 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1982).
85. See In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227,
254 (W.D. Tex. 1979); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 68 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
86. See Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (D. Mass. 1982).
87. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
88. Id. at 235.
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tity of the target companies and had purchased stock in them prior to
release of takeover announcements. Characterizing the case as one in-
volving the legal effect of silence, the court reasoned that silence in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities had in the past been found
to operate as a fraud only where there existed "a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transac-
tion." 9 Chiarella had undertaken no prior dealings with the target
companies; he was not their agent, nor was he a fiduciary or person in
whom trust and confidence had been reposed.' Thus he had no duty.
In the wake of Chiarella, requests for dismissal for failure to ade-
quately allege a duty of disclosure have increased,9" resulting in consid-
erable dispute over the bases for imposing a duty of disclosure. Chiarella
seems to say that a fiduciary relationship or one premised upon trust
and confidence must exist.9 2 This is the view typically advanced by de-
fendants. Nevertheless, so cramped a reading has not found favor with
the courts. A duty to disclose has been found to "inhere in the securities
laws" where a licensed securities professional substantially involved in
facilitating the public sale of securities knowingly withheld material in-
formation.9" A comparable duty has been posited where the defendant
knowingly or recklessly participates in a fraudulent scheme.9 4 A duty
has also been found to arise from a contractual relationship and from
the specific requirements of SEC rules.95
89. Id. at 230.
90. Id. at 232.
91. See, e.g., Berman v. Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 97,857 at 90,297 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981); Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 509 F. Supp. 68, 75
n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (treating existence of duty as a question of law not properly considered
in context of 9(b) motion); cf. Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir.
1980) (complaint dismissed for failure to plead a factual basis for allegation that fiduciary
duties existed); Kirshner v. Goldberg, 506 F. Supp. 454, 457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
Even before Chiarella some courts insisted that each complaint set forth an explana-
tion of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. Goldberg v. Meridor, 81 F.R.D. 105, 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Todd v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,727, at 94,870 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1978) (existence of duty of disclosure a
legal issue, not a matter of factual specificity under 9(b)).
92. See 445 U.S. at 232.
93. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 103 S. Ct.
3255 (1983); see SEC v. Cayman Islands Reinsurance Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,717, at 93,593 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1982) (duty need not be alleged where
corporate director was directly involved in the offering and knew of the misstatements, yet
failed to disclose them). In Dirks the Supreme Court noted the court of appeals' holding that
Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty because of his broker-dealer status. 103 S. Ct. at 3267 n.26.
Characterizing this duty theory as "novel," the Court found the issue was not presented in the
SEC proceedings and was not therefore preserved for appeal. Id.
94. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1982).
95. Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 941-42 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denid, 103 S. Ct. 475 (1983).
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C Churning
Although misrepresentations and omissions are the most common
bases of fraud allegations, other deceptive acts are also within the cover-
age of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.96 An area of fre-
quent litigation concerns churning by broker-dealers. Churning is
excessive trading by a person in control of another's securities, under-
taken for the purpose of generating commissions. What constitutes ex-
cessive trading is determined in light of the owner's investment
objectives and financial situation.9 7
A general allegation of churning or excessive trading is insuffi-
cient." The pleader should identify when the churning occurred and
the securities or account involved.99 A description of the plaintiffs in-
vestment objectives may be necessary."°  In addition, the complaint
must present some quantitative information concerning activity in the
account from which the court can draw an inference of excessive trad-
ing. l01 This requirement may be relaxed if the plaintiff does not have
all of the documents necessary to measure the account's activity.
1 0 2
96. These include tipping and market manipulation, in addition to churning. Tipping -
the selective disclosure of material inside information - is a well recognized violation of rule
lOb-5. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 839-42 (1983). Market
manipulation, such as the withholding of dividends to depress a stock's price, is a further
example of misleading conduct that may be found fraudulent. See United States v. Charnay,
537 F.2d 341, 347-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
97. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 1982); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co.,
619 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). For a more detailed treatment of churning, see Posner,
Options Account Fraud Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 Bus. LAw. 571 (1984); Note, Churn-
ing by Securities Dealeri, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1967).
98. Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,867, at 95,515 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Vetter v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 481
F. Supp. 64, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
99. Russo v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 613, 618 (N.D. Il. 1982); see
Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 509 F. Supp. 68, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
100. See Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. at 394.
101. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 554 F. Supp. at 618 (must allege "facts to allow for a
determination of turnover ratio in the account and/or the percentage of the account value
paid in commissions"); see Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (D. Mass. 1982)
(complaint alleging annual turnover rate of six hundred percent held sufficient).
It may be possible to prove churning without statistical evidence concerning the vol-
ume of activity in an account. See, e.g., Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361,
1369-70 (7th Cir. 1983) (churning established without expert testimony or statistical analysis
of account); Quigley v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1980-82 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,330, at 25,597 (Jan. 22, 1982) (entry of even one trade that is not for
customer's benefit constitutes churning). To the extent that the plaintiff can prevail at trial
without statistical evidence of the volume of activity in his account, requiring the pleadings to
set forth such information is surely wrong.
102. See Juster v. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin, Gruntal & Co., 554 F. Supp. 331, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff alleged that defendant advised her to discard confirmation slips).
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D. Identif ng the Defendant
Securities actions usually involve multiple defendants. Commonly
some defendants will be sued on a theory of primary liability; others will
be sued on a theory of secondary liability.° 3 The complaint must give
some indication of the theory of liability, whether primary, secondary,
or both, as to each defendant, and must state the factual basis underly-
ing each defendant's culpability. 1
0 4
Quite often a complaint involving multiple defendants will list a
number of misrepresentations and omissions that are imputed to all the
defendants.'0 5 In other cases the complaint will describe a fraudulent
scheme and link the defendants to it through allegations of participa-
tion, conspiracy, or aiding and abetting. 0 6 Such vague references to the
nature of a defendant's involvement in fraudulent conduct are inade-
quate.'0 7 Likewise, blanket group references which obscure a clear read-
ing of the role each defendant is alleged to have played have been
condemned.'0 8 Each defendant is entitled to know the circumstances
allegedly constituting fraud on his part.'0 9 If misrepresentations are
103. The seminal article on secondary liability is Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Secunties Law
Fraud Cases.- Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemniftaton, and Contribution, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 394 (1982) (recognizing secondary liability on a conspiracy basis); Fischel, Seconday
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80 (1981) (arguing
against secondary liability under federal securities laws).
104. Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1035-37 (D. Minn. 1981);
Goldberg v. Meridor, 81 F.R.D. 105, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
105. E.g., Homburger v. Venture Minerals, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,858, at 94,424 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1982).
106. Eg., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 1983) (aiding and abetting);
Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 608 (2d.Cir. 1972) (conspiracy); Kirschner v. Goldberg, 506 F.
Supp. 454, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (participation and aiding and abetting).
107. See cases cited supra note 104. Some courts may be more liberal when there are multi-
ple defendants and the nature of their involvement in causing the misrepresentation is un-
clear, but even if identification of the defendant's role is relaxed, the misrepresentation itself
must be explicitly stated. Eg., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 774-
75 (D. Colo. 1964).
108. E.g., Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 744-45 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Kennedy v. Nicastro, 503 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Meridor, 81 F.R.D. at IIl
("The complaint repeatedly alleges that 'the defendants' engaged in fraudulent conduct with-
out specifying how such disparate defendants as directors, corporations, investment bankers,
accountants and law firms participated in the [conduct].").
109. Mendor, 81 F.R.D. at 111; Gilbert v. Clark, 13 F.R.D. 498, 499 (D. Mass. 1952). A
contrary view, accepting considerable generality in describing the defendant's role, is re-
flected in Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In that case the following
allegations were found sufficient to withstand a 9(b) objection:
Each defendants [sic] either drafted, assisted in the drafting or actually promulgated
the fraudulent statements or decisions regarding omissions, or with knowledge ac-
quired, aided in the publication of the fraudulent statements, and/or omitted to
inform the public of the facts although knowing of the falsity of said statements.
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pled, the defendant must be told whether he is alleged to have made
those misrepresentations. 1 ' If omissions are imputed to him, that and
the defendant's duty of disclosure must be pled."1 '
Schemes, conspiracies, and other group activities have their own
pleading requirements. The facts underlying an alleged scheme must be
stated and the nature of each defendant's participation delineated." 2
The same is necessary in alleging a conspiracy. 1 3 Similarly, an allega-
tion of aiding and abetting must describe the fraud that was aided and
set forth circumstances showing the alleged aider and abettor rendered
substantial assistance to the fraud.' 14 If liability is premised on the con-
trolling persons statutes, 1 5 identification of the controlled person and
the general basis for alleging a control relationship may be necessary. 116
E Alternative Pleading
The common law prohibited alternative pleading.1 7 For example,
Id. at 579 n.8 (quoting complaint). See also In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig.,
416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (allowing identification of defendants by category and
allegations of group conduct); cf. Hudson v. Capital Management Int'l, Inc., [1982-83 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 99,221, at 95, 895 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1982) (allegations
of group conduct insufficient if defendants' involvement with subject transaction began and
ended at different times); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 774 (D.
Colo. 1964) (concluding that while plaintiff might not be privy to the workings of a group of
defendants that acted in concert to defraud him, plaintiff could identify the defendants with
whom he dealt and the circumstances under which they dealt with him).
110. See, e.g., Shearson/Amerzcan Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. at 394; Glickman, Lurte, Eiger &
Co., 520 F. Supp. at 1036.
111. Kirschner v. Goldberg, 506 F. Supp. 454, 457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
112. See Natowitz v. Mehlman, 542 F. Supp. 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Berman .v Metz-
ger, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,857, at 90,297 (D.D.C. Feb. 9,
1981) (not sufficient to describe each defendant's role in scheme by reference to general role
such as solicitor, advisor or purchaser).
113. See Gordon, 467 F.2d at 608. But see Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
114. Goldberg, 506 F. Supp. at 458-59; Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 418,
424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
115. The phrase "controlling person" is a statutory term of art - broadly encompassing
an amorphous class of persons who by virtue of stock ownership, agency, family ties and other
factors may be deemed to control another person. See generally Comment, Secondaoy Liabdi of
Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts. Toward an Improved Analysis, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1345
(1978). Both the 1933 and 1934 Act impose secondary liability on controlling persons for the
acts of those they control. See Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982).
116. In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,157, at 95,585-86 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1983); Glickman, Lurie, Eiger &Co., 520 F. Supp. at
1035.
117. C. CLARK, supra note 36, at 255. See generally McDonald, Alternative Pleading: 81, II, 48
MICH. L. REV. 311, 349 (1950); Hankin, Alternative and Hypothetical Pleadings, 33 YALE L.J.
365, 366-68 (1924).
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an allegation that the defendant authored an article "or" caused it to be
authored was improper,"" as was an allegation that a promissory note
"was lost or destroyed."'' 9  Proscribing disjunctive allegations was
thought to facilitate certainty, but it frequently worked injustice. All
too often the pleader was forced to frame more specific allegations than
his information warranted. In consequence, the proof at trial failed to
conform to what was pled. Under the strict common law rules on vari-
ance this could be fatal, even though the evidence had, on some basis
not pled, shown a right to relief.'2 °
The drafters of the federal rules sought to sweep aside this wooden
view of the pleadings. Rule 8(e)(2)121 expressly authorizes alternative
and hypothetical pleading. It is supplemented by other rules providing
for joinder of multiple parties'2 2 and claims 123 and directing the court to
grant the relief to which the pleader is entitled, regardless of the relief
sought in his pleading. 124 These rules acknowledge the complex fact
situations out of which lawsuits spring. They provide for framing plead-
ings that accommodate the pleader's uncertainties and enhance the like-
lihood that the pleader will receive fair relief.
Although alternative pleading has generally received warm ap-
proval, 1 25 some securities cases, none of which discuss rule 8(e)(2), have
used rule 9(b) to circumscribe alternative allegations. For example, one
court has concluded that an allegation providing that each defendant's
118. H. STEPHEN, TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 339-340 (3d ed. 1882).
119. Stone v. Graves, 8 Mo. 148, 152 (1843).
120. Simply put, the doctrine of variance requires a party's proof to conform to the allega-
tions of his complaint. If the evidence showed, for instance, that the plaintiff's vehicle struck
the defendant's, but the complaint alleged that the defendant struck plaintiff, the variance in
proof might defeat the plaintiff's claim, even though the evidence established that the defend-
ant's negligence caused the collision. See 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 34, $ 8.03, at
8-22, 23 (2d ed. 1983).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) reads:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alter-
nately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or
defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of
them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insuffi-
cient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may
also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and
whether based on legal, equitable, or maritime grounds. All statements shall be
made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
122. FED. R. CIv. P. 20(a).
123. Id. 18(a).
124. Id. 54(c).
125. See C. CLARK, supra note 36, § 42, at 255. Judge Clark unhesitatingly concluded that
the rule permitting alternative allegations was "one of the most simple, desirable, and effec-
tive improvements upon the common law .... " Id. Alternative pleading has proved emi-
nently workable; many decisions may be cited for the proposition that a pleader has the right
to pursue multiple theories of liability through alternative and even inconsistent allegations.
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liability "arises from the fact that each has either engaged in or is engag-
ing in all or part of the unlawful acts charged herein" fails to comport
with rule 9(b). 126 Although the language is probably more prolix than
necessary, these allegations seem precisely what rule 8(e)(2) envisions.
The court, however, concluded that "double use of the disjunctive 'or'
makes it impossible for each defendant to know the precise misconduct
with which he is charged."
1 27
Another intrusion on alternative pleading appears in cases holding
that the plaintiff must allege whether a defendant is sued as a primary
wrongdoer or an aider and abettor.' By implication these cases at-
tempt to compel the plaintiff to pursue a single theory-primary or sec-
ondary liability. Yet a defendant may be liable for a direct violation of
the antifraud provisions and also on the basis of having aided another's
violation. 29  More fundamentally, where fraud involves multiple par-
ticipants, the plaintiff may not be sufficiently apprised of the relation-
ship between them to distinguish the primary wrongdoers from those
who aided them. This does not mean that the plaintiff lacks an ade-
quate basis for asserting a claim, for despite the inability to delineate the
relationships among the defendants, the plaintiff may have substantial
information showing their involvement in a fraud. 3 ' Or the plaintiff
may know that at least one of the defendants is the source of the injury
but because of the circumstances of the case the plaintiff may be uncer-
See, e.g., Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1971); Michael v. Clark Equip. Co.,
380 F.2d 351, 352 (2d Cir. 1967); Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171, 178 (8th Cir. 1967).
Provided the defendant is given fair notice of the pleader's claim, and so long as the
pleader has not interposed alternative allegations merely to delay or vex his adversary, there
is no ground for objection. The final sentence of FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) reminds the pleader
that the right to assert alternative allegations is, like all averments, subject to the duty of good
faith imposed by FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
126. Crystal v. Foy, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 98,204, at
91,428 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1981) (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 91,428-29.
128. E.g., Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 97,857, at 90,297;
Merndor, 81 F.R.D. at 111.
129. See SEC v. Cayman Islands Reinsurance Corp., Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,717, at 93,593 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1982) (upholding allegation that
each defendant engaged in a primary violation and aided and abetted the others).
130. Where a conspiracy is alleged, several courts have acknowledged that it would be
unreasonable to expect the pleader to detail the inner workings of the conspirators. See, e.g.,
Shamrock Assoc. v. Moraga Corp., 557 F. Supp. 198, 205 (D. Del. 1983) (although complaint
dismissed as inadequate, plaintiff not expected to "present a highly explicit record of the
intricacies of [a] conspiracy."); In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig.,
467 F. Supp. 227, 252 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (pleader "may not be in a position to delineate the
precise role of the defendants" in a conspiracy but "once the core conspiracy is set out in
sufficient detail, there remains the obligation to inform each defendant of what he did to join
the conspiracy").
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tain as to which of the defendants is liable. 3 ' Rule 20(a) recognizes that
such situations exist and authorizes joinder of defendants against whom
the plaintiff asserts relief jointly, severally, or alternatively. Driving
home the drafters' recognition that defendants who are not ultimately
liable will on occasion be sued, the concluding sentence of rule 20(a)
provides that judgment may be entered "against one or more defend-
ants according to their respective liabilities.
1 ' 3 2
When the plaintiff is uncertain which of several defendants may be
liable, it should be sufficient if the plaintiff describes the basic facts giv-
ing rise to the fraud and alleges some reasonable basis for believing the
defendants may have participated in the fraud. 3 3 Specific allegations
describing the exact manner in which each defendant furthered the
fraud should not be required. In this way the defendant will be given
notice, and the plaintiff's uncertainty will be accommodated in a man-
ner consistent with rule 20(a).
F Scienter
The requirements for proof of a defendant's state of mind vary
under the commonly used anti-fraud statutes. Sections 12(2) and 17(a)
of the Securities Act 134 offer the possibility of developing liability
through negligence.135 Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act does not. 136 In
131. See, e.g., Lipton v. Documation, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,788, at 94,040 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 1982) (plaintiff, defrauded by false financial
reports approved by board of directors, unable to plead what each director did).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
133. See Documation, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,788, at
94,040 (plaintiff required to describe how documents issued by corporation were fraudulent
but not obligated to explain how each corporate executive named as a defendant participated
in the preparation and dissemination of the documents; it was sufficient that the defendant
executives had the responsibility for managing the corporation). In In re Commonwealth
Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 254 (W.D. Tex. 1979), the plaintiff
alleged that " 'some or all of the defendants' " made certain misstatements and omissions in
connection with a stock manipulation conspiracy. Recognizing the difficulty of pleading the
exact workings of the conspiracy, the court sanctioned some generality in describing the de-
fendants' involvement:
Although plaintiff may not be in a position to delineate the precise role of the de-
fendants, once the core conspiracy is set out in sufficient detail, there remains the
obligation to inform each defendant of what he did to join the conspiracy.
Id. at 252. The court insisted, however, that there be allegations as to the involvement of
"each participant ('some of the defendants' will not do). Id See also cases cited supra
note 109.
134. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
135. Section 12(2) has consistently been held actionable on a negligence basis. E.g., Wer-
theim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764, 767 (10th Cir. 1980);
Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Kaminsky, An Analysis of
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Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder137 the Supreme Court eliminated negligent
conduct as a predicate for lOb-5 liability by holding that scienter is an
element of a 10b-5 claim. What will satisfy the scienter requirement
after Hochfe/der has been much debated.'3 8 The Court defined scienter
as a mental state embracing an "intent to deceive, manipulate or de-
fraud."' 3 9  Other portions of the opinion suggested, however, that
knowledge or recklessness might suffice." 4 The overwhelming majority
of post-Hochfelder decisions in the lower courts accept some formulation
of recklessness. 4 ' Nevertheless the differences in required mental state
present opportunities for pleading stratagems.
A troubling problem concerns supporting detail sometimes re-
quired to be pled along with scienter. Rule 9(b) speaks directly to the
manner of pleading scienter. It provides that "[m]alice, intent, knowl-
edge, and other condition of mind may be averred generally."' 4 2 From
this most courts have concluded without hesitation that the pleader has
no obligation to plead a basis for inferring fraudulent intent. 43 In the
Securities Litigation Under § 12(2) and How It Compares with Rule 1Ob-5, 13 Hous. L. REV. 231,
233-36 (1976).
With respect to § 17(a), the courts are divided on the existence of a private action for
damages. For example, compare Landry v. All Am. Assurance Corp., 688 F.2d 381, 389 (5th
Cir. 1982) (no private action) with Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815
(9th Cir. 1981) (private action exists). The courts that recognize a private action are in dis-
cord as to the state of mind required. For example, compare Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp.
571, 578 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (dictum) (negligence sufficient under clauses (2) and (3) of § 17(a))
with In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., [1982-83 Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,157, at
95,587 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1983) (§ 17(a) claim dismissed for failure to allege scienter). For a
detailed discussion of whether there is an implied private right of action under § 17(a), see
Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5" Imphed Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641 (1978); Note, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: Implica-
tion of Private Right of Action, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 244 (1981).
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
137. 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
138. See, e.g., Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of Recklessness after Hochfelder and Aaron,
8 SEC. REG. L.J. 179 (1980); Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-
5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977).
139. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
140. See, e.g., id. at 197 (the statutory language "strongly suggests that section 10(b) was
intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct" (emphasis added)); id. at 194 n. 12
("In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for
purposes of imposing liability for some act.").
141. Eg., Healy v. Catalyst Recovery, 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980); Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d
1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F.
Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); cf. Decker v.
Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1982) (reserving decision on whether aider
and abettor liability may be predicated on recklessness in the absence of a fiduciary
relationship).
142. FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
143. E.g., McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1980);
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Second Circuit, however, a line of cases has evolved which requires
plaintiffs invoking rule l0b-5 to plead facts giving rise to a "strong infer-
ence" of knowledge or reckless conduct by the defendant.144 This places
a dubious gloss on rule 9(b). Not only is it inconsistent with the lan-
guage of the rule, which contemplates precisely the opposite require-
ment, it also creates an unrealistic pleading burden. Proving state of
mind is complex and is usually accomplished through circumstantial ev-
idence.145 As a matter of proof, issues of scienter may depend as much
on credibility as anything else.146 Although the skilled trial examiner
may graphically convey a feel for the credibility of witnesses, even the
most gifted writer will never capture the demeanor of witnesses in his
pleadings.
Rule 11 has also been cited as a basis for requiring plaintiffs to
plead a factual basis for their scienter allegations. In In re Ramada Inns
Security Lizhalion 147 a district court felt rule 1I "would be stripped of any
meaning" if the plaintiffs were not required to articulate a basis for their
charges of deliberate misconduct. The court was persuaded of this even
though it realized proof of scienter could be dependent on circumstan-
tial evidence. Discovery was denied, and plaintiffs were directed to mar-
shall in their complaint sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that a
reasonable basis for pleading scienter existed.' 48 That interpretation of
the rule is wrong. Rule 11 imposes a duty upon counsel to determine
Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975); Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393,
397 (9th Cir. 1973). But see SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1315, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1982).
144. E.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971); Posner v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 92 F.R.D. 765, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aj'dmem., 697 F.2d 296 (2nd Cir.
1982). But see Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d at 120. The Second Circuit's approach is gather-
ing acceptance in district courts in other circuits. See, e.g., Hudson v. Capital Management
Int'l, Inc., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 99,221, at 95,896 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 6, 1982); In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1132-34 (D. Del. 1982).
145. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 692 n.30 (1983); Woodward v.
Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Dittrich, 3 F.R.D. 475, 477
(E.D. Ky. 1943). The realities of proof at trial were aptly described in Beck v. United States,
305 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962):
Fraud or the existence of a fraudulent scheme is seldom susceptible to proof solely
by direct evidence and in nearly every such case, direct and circumstantial evidence
together with the inferences to be drawn therefrom must be relied upon for proof.
Id. at 598.
146. Oil & Gas Ventures-First 1958 Fund, Ltd. v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744, 756 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (In a fraud case "[t]he demeanor of witnesses before the trier of fact, with an opportu-
nity to appraise credibility, may well mean the difference between acceptance and rejection
of crucial testimony.').
147. 550 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Del. 1982).
148. d. at 1134.
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that there is some legal and factual basis for the pleading. 149 It does not,
however, address the manner of drafting the complaint. That is the of-
fice of rules 8 and 9. Moreover, rule 9(b) specifically tells the pleader
how he may allege scienter. If rule 11 were truly a basis for requiring
the pleader to plead a factual basis for scienter, it could just as readily
be invoked to require detailed allegations of negligence.
Resolving state of mind issues on the pleadings will close the court-
house to many meritorious claims that could have been proved with
adequate discovery.' 5 0 The misstatement or omission of material infor-
mation forms a sufficient basis to press a claim if the pleader reasonably
believes the omission or misstatement was caused by the defendant.''
The defendant may ultimately not be liable; he may lack the requisite
state of mind. That is an issue to be explored through discovery. It is
enough at the pleading stage that counsel has a reasonable belief that
there is a factual and legal basis for his claim.'5 2 Requiring factual
149. Before its recent amendment (see infa note 223) Rule 11 was treated as establishing a
subjective standard under which counsel would be deemed in violation of the rule only upon
a finding of bad faith. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980). For general
discussions of Rule 11, see Browne, The Signifrance of the Signature.. A Comment on the Obligations
Imposed by Civil Rule 11, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1981); Risinger, Honesty i Pleading and Its
Enforcement.- Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1976). In its amended form rule 11 seeks to fix a more exacting, objective standard:
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the
facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard
is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. . . . This standard is more strin-
gent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater
range of circumstances will trigger its violation.
Advisory Committee Note to amended Rule 11 (citation omitted).
150. See Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1982) (intimating that less
detail is required where complaint is challenged before discovery); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F.
Supp. 476, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (rejecting 9(b) objection and stating: "Only through discovery
will both sides gain the information required to assert their respective claims and defenses.").
For an example of the burden that can be placed on plaintiffs by requiring them to plead a
factual basis for scienter without discovery, see Posner v. Coopers & Lybrand, 92 F.R.D. 765
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aJ'dmem., 697 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (complaint dismissed for failure to
allege date defendants became aware of certain facts despite plaintiffs allegations that the
precise date could not be pled before discovery).
151. This is obviously a generalization to which exceptions can be postulated. To hypoth-
esize but one example, counsel's presuit investigation might reveal that an accountant's con-
duct in preparing a false financial statement was an unwitting failure to discover acts of
embezzlement that a proper audit would have revealed. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) (securities fraud complaint grounded in negli-
gence). On these facts neither a reasonable nor honest basis for naming the accountant as a
defendant on a claim requiring scienter would exist.
152. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373, reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 915
(1966) (charges of fraud "based on reasonable beliefs growing out of careful investigation"
should not be dismissed); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180,
1203 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (Rule 9(b) satisfied if complaint gives defendant notice and evidences
a reasonable belief on plaintiff's part that it has merit); Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
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allegations of scienter nurtures circumlocution and prolixity through the
need to describe circumstantial evidence from which scienter may be
inferred. The drafters of rule 9(b) apparently appreciated these
problems and addressed them by approving general allegations of
scienter.
G. Information and Beh'f Allegations
Although the federal rules do not directly address this point, a
party may base his allegations on personal knowledge or on information
and belief.'5 3 The integrity of the allegations is protected by rule 11,
which places primary responsibility for pleading on the attorney. 15 4
Counsel is required to vouch for the pleading through his signature,
which constitutes a certificate that "to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry" the pleading is fac-
tually and legally tenable.' 55
The federal rules do not require the pleader to specify which allega-
tions are made on personal knowledge and which on information and
belief; nevertheless, the practice of identifying allegations based on in-
formation and belief is prevalent. Presumably this is the perpetuation of
a practice first developed under the pleading codes.' 56 This ritual would
seem innocuous enough except that what is essentially a matter of style
has, perhaps through nothing more than tired adherence to habit, ac-
quired the rigidity of law.'5 7 Courts agree that a party may plead on
information and belief,15 but in a fraud claim, the allegations must be
Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 540 (N.D. Il. 1981) (same); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp.
714, 726 (M.D.N.C. 1980) (same); see also Risinger, supra note 149, at 52-57; Hankin, supra
note 117, at 365-68. For a discussion of what constitutes a "reasonable basis," see infra note
223.
153. Cf Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. at 370-71 (verification of complaint by plaintiff on
basis of faith in information obtained from adviser, as opposed to personal knowledge, suffi-
cient); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) (authorizing a party to state lack of "knowledge or infor-
mation" as a basis for denying an allegation).
154. Risinger, supra note 149, at 7-8.
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
156. C. CLARK, supra note 36, § 36, at 220. At common law, pleading on information and
belief was not permitted. Id.
157. It has been suggested that pleading on information and belief is a practical necessity;
otherwise the pleader could not avoid the "appearance of perjury" when he lacks personal
knowledge. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1224, at
156 (1969). This is doubtful. Since the rules do not require allegations on personal knowl-
edge, there is no reason to believe the pleader is warranting personal knowledge. See Hilton
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. at 370-71 (proper for plaintiff to verify complaint on basis of informa-
tion obtained from investigation by advisors). All that is being said when a complaint is filed
is that the pleader's attorney believes there is a good ground, based on knowledge, informa-
tion and belief, to assert the claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, infta note 223.
158. Eg., Carroll v. Morrison Hotel Corp., 149 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1945); General
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accompanied by a statement of the information on which the belief is
predicated.1 59 Failure to identify those sources with precision may occa-
sion a successful 9(b) objection. 16 It is also insisted that the pleader
resort to pleading on information and belief only where the matter al-
leged is peculiarly within the knowledge of the adverse party.1 6 '
Since the rules do not require plaintiffs to identify the informa-
tional basis of their allegations, prudent pleaders will stand their ground
and plead without distinction as to what is based upon personal knowl-
edge and what on information.1 62 Others, of course, will make the dis-
tinction, thereby unnecessarily complicating their task. An example of
the burdens to which the pleader is subjected by pleading an informa-
tional distinction is Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc. 163 The issue in Morgan
was the manner of pleading scienter. Pleading on information and be-
lief, the plaintiff had generally alleged that the defendant had know-
ingly or recklessly disregarded certain facts. The court observed that
under the second sentence of rule 9(b) a general averment of knowledge
is proper. Nevertheless, according to the court, the plaintiff, by pleading
on information and belief, was obligated to state facts lending credence
to his belief. The court conceded that if the plaintiff had based his alle-
gations on personal knowledge, his allegations "might" have been
sufficient. "
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The quest for factually explicit pleadings is neither new nor pecu-
Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp., 8 F.R.D. 568, 570 (W.D. Del. 1948); Bowles v.
Sunshine Packing Corp., 5 F.R.D. 282, 287 (D. Pa. 1946).
159. E.g., Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 608 (2d Cir. 1972); Duane v. Altenburg, 297 F.2d
515, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1962); Ross v. Warner, 480 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
160. The following allegations concerning the source of plaintiff's information were held
too indefinite in Crystal v. Foy, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,204
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1981):
The basis for plaintiff's information and belief are [defendant's] filings with the SEC
and communications to shareholders during the years 1974 through 1978; news arti-
cles and press releases appearing in the Wall Street Journal, Business Week, The
New York Times, Forbes and Fortune Magazines; research report of various invest-
ment banking and brokerage firms, other public sources of information and the in-
vestigation of plaintiff's counsel herein.
Id. at 91,429 n.2. In the court's view the sources should have been sufficiently identified to
allow opposing counsel and the court to review them. Id. at 91,429.
161. See, e.g., Gordon, 467 F.2d at 608; McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631,
638-39 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
162. But see Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 418, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (opin-
ing that the distinction is a meaningful one that should be observed).
163. 81 F.R.D. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
164. Id.
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liar to securities litigation. Rules of procedure have always provided a
means of ridding the calendar of cases that have been prejudged for one
reason or another.' 65 At times a court, consciously or unconsciously, will
perceive a lack of merit in a case. If the opportunity is presented, some
ostensible procedural defect may provide the basis for concluding the
litigation.16 6 Beyond the idiosyncracies that may shape a particular
case, there have historically been categories of cases that for want of a
better description have been characterized as disfavored. The reasons
for disfavored status vary, but disfavored litigation commonly encom-
passes lawsuits involving a disproportionate number of unsuccessful
claims, unusual complexity, or some special risk of damage to the de-
fendant's reputation. The resolution of an allegation of fraud involves
all three of these difficulties.
In this section the rationale advanced in support of strict pleading
in securities litigation is discussed. The conclusion is reached that while
strict pleading is intended to further worthy policies, detailed fact plead-
ing of the type catalogued in the preceding section is inconsistent with
the role the drafters of the federal rules envisioned rule 9(b) would play
in federal pleading. The article then considers two practices-denial of
discovery and dismissal-that have been utilized to compel compliance
with rule 9(b). After arguing that both practices are improper, the arti-
cle concludes with the suggestion that rule 11 provides an efficacious
means of dealing with abusive securities lawsuits, which does not pose
an undesirable risk to meritorious claims.
A. The Rationale for Strict Enforcement of Rule 9(b)
There was serious pressure when the federal rules were enacted for
the formulation of special pleading rules in complicated cases, especially
copyright and patent suits. 167 Nevertheless, no special rules were en-
acted with the exception of those pertaining to fraud and mistake."
Still, resistance to the concept of pleading a general statement of the
pleader's claim has never been eliminated. 1' Although efforts to amend
165. Clark, The Handmaid ofjusice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 304 (1938).
166. Id, cf. A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 69 (1982) (relating instance of trial judge
exploiting the deference afforded findings of fact on appeal as a means of minimizing possibil-
ity of reversal); see also id. at xix-xx.
167. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case", 21 F.R.D. 45, 48 (1957).
168. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967) (Rule 9(b) indicates particular-
ity is not required in cases other than fraud and mistake).
169. In a notable example, the 1951 judicial conference of the Ninth Circuit cited un-
founded lawsuits, overly burdensome discovery, and the need for clarity in defining the issues
as reasons for an amendment to Rule 8 that would have required parties to state the "facts
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rule 8 have failed, the courts themselves have eroded notice-type plead-
ing. Indeed, the conclusion is unmistakable that resistance to conclusory
but facially sufficient claims in disfavored actions has produced a furtive
common law-of-fact-pleading, 0
Fortified by the Supreme Court's chary approach to lOb-5 litiga-
tion, 17 many lower courts have been quick to justify strict pleading on
policy grounds. Although variously phrased, essentially three reasons
have been advanced to justify pleading fraud with particularity. They
are not new. They restate the rationale at common law in the context of
contemporary litigation. 7 2 The first is notice. Fraud is a multifaceted
tort of frequently complex dimensions. Requiring specific allegations
insures that the defendant will have fair notice of the plaintiff's
claims. 1
7 3
Second, the serious consequences of allegations of fraud warrant
strict pleading." 4 Suggestions of fraud tarnish reputations and deni-
grate the goodwill of businesses.17 5 Professionals are particularly vulner-
able to these charges. 7 6 Irreparable loss of standing and prestige may
upon which they based their claim." Clain or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 255-257 (1951).
For further criticism of general pleading, see McCaskill, Modern Philosophy of Pleadng, supra
note 41; Rothschild, The Federal Wonderland (Some "Sinplifted" Federal Concepts), 18 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 16, 25-28 (1952) (detailing the problems with notice pleading).
170. Certain causes of action share fraud's special pleading burdens. Special requirements
have historically been most associated with defamation and malicious prosecution, two torts
long characterized as disfavored. C. CLARK, supra note 36, § 48, at 314-16. Although these
torts enjoy no special status under the federal rules, some courts still require the pleader to set
forth more than a general description when pleading them. See, e.g., Brook Water Co. v.
Jaffe, 248 F. Supp, 702, 709 (D.N.J. 1968). The explosion of civil rights litigation during the
1960s involved an inordinate volume of meritless claims that placed considerable strain on
the federal judiciary. In an effort to minimize the burden of frivolous claims, many of which
involved pro se prisoner complaints, a considerable body of courts imposed upon plaintiffs a
duty to plead the facts supporting their claims. See, e.g., Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 242,
245-46 (2d Cir. 1979). Factually explicit allegations in habeas corpus petitions have also
been required. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977). In antitrust litiga-
tion special pleading has enjoyed favor in many courts, e.g. Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-
Connally Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), although in recent years the need for
detailed fact pleading has been increasingly rejected, e.g., Brett v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (5th Cir. 1972). Most recently, a requirement of particu-
larity in alleging standing has gained favor. See Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading and
Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 390, 415-20 (1980).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 14-31.
172. See supra note 36.
173. E.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 197 9), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980); Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088, 1092-93 (D. Mass. 1982); In re Common-
wealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
174. Eg., Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972).
175. Id.; Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1982).
176. See Billard v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1982); Rich v. Touche
Ross & Co., 68 F.R.D. 243, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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befall the attorney or accountant who is linked with a fraudulent
scheme through attenuated allegations that may take years to disprove.
Comparable problems are presented for public companies which may be
obligated to disclose fraud charges, no matter how ill-founded, in public
filings. 7 7 If a plaintiff is to be allowed to make allegations of such pro-
digious consequence, he must be prepared to delineate clearly his claim.
Third, particularity in pleading reduces unwarranted discovery by
facilitating the early disposition of baseless claims.' 7 8 There is a long
history of frivolous securities claims, particularly in class and derivative
litigation.179 Complaints that are unlikely to succeed at trial still hold
monetary value. Furthermore, liberal discovery rules enable a plaintiff
to consume the time of others in pursuing a largely groundless claim.
This adds what the Supreme Court has tagged an "in terrorem incre-
ment" to the settlement value of the plaintiff's claim. 80 The accuracy
of that observation is supported by empirical evidence documenting the
prevalence of discovery problems in securities litigation. 8 ' A pleading
code that mandates specificity enables the court to test the sufficiency of
the allegations and, if appropriate, make an early disposition of the case.
The justifications advanced for added specificity reflect legitimate
concerns, but whether a system of pleading can provide an efficient
means of achieving anything beyond fair notice is open to serious ques-
tion. As developed below, neither the drafters of the federal rules, nor
the courts construing rule 9(b) in its formative years, viewed the rule as
a significant intrusion on the general pleading allowed by rule 8.
The drafters considered the Appendix of Forms that accompany
the federal rules to be the clearest expression of the form they intended
pleadings to take. 8 2 Form 13 addresses fraud and illustrates what is
177. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S 723, 740 (1975); Sargent, The SEC
and the Individual Investor. Restoring Hir Confidence in the Market, 60 VA. L. REV. 553, 562-72
(1974).
178. See, e.g., A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d at 557; Gordon, 467 F.2d at 607.
179. See Haudek, supra note 48, at 768-70. For a recent example see Miller v. Schweikart,
413 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
180. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741; cf. Judge Higginbotham's parry in In re Common-
wealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Securities Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Tex. 1979):
Courts must be sensitive to the balancing which Rule 9(b) requires. The
rule invites abuse by both plaintiffs and defendants. An unbalanced application on
the one hand gives plaintiffs unchecked access to the in [sic] terrorem power of the
federal discovery mechanism or on the other hand allows defendants by sophistical
claims of ignorance, to plow meritorious claims into stumps.
Id. at 250-51 (footnote omitted).
181. C. ELLINCTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE, 28-29 (1979).
182. Clark, supra note 166, at 316 (1938); Cook, supra note 34, at 245-46; see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 84 ("forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules and are
intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.").
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necessary to plead a fraudulent conveyance. Its operative allegations
appear in paragraph 4:
Defendant C.D. on or about . . .conveyed all his prop-
erty, real and personal [or specify and describe] to defendant
E.F. for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff and hindering and
delaying the collection of the indebtedness evidenced by the
note above referred to.1
8 3
Lawyers accustomed to the tangle of judicially imposed rules currently
encumbering securities pleading cannot avoid being struck by the stark
simplicity of these allegations. Beyond the date, the parties, and some
indication of the property involved, there is scant detail. The docu-
ments by which the conveyance was made are not identified; the reason
the conveyance was fraudulent is conclusorily stated; and scienter is gen-
erally averred. If we are to take the drafters at their word-if form 13 is
"intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the
rules contemplate"' 8 4 -then rule 9(b) was not a marked departure from
the simplistic pleading generally envisioned by the rules.
Early case law confirms the simplicity suggested by form 13. Plead-
ers were directed to clarify ambiguous pleadings, 185 or complaints
merely alleging "fraud" without supporting detail, 18 6 or prolix com-
plaints which circumvented the "short and plain statement" require-
ment. 8 7 While a few decisions were overly technical,' 88 in general the
courts accepted averments that merely gave the defendant fair notice.' 89
Rule 9(b) was harmonized with rule 8's standard of simplicity, concise-
183. FORM 13, APPENDIX OF FORMS TO FED. R. CIv. P.
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 84.
185. Zimmerman v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 438, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(confusion as to whether plaintiff suing for breach of contract or fraud).
186. Dixie Mercerizing Co. v. Triangle Thread Mills, Inc. 17 F.R.D. 8, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); see National Daiiy Prods. Corp., 30 F. Supp. at 439.
187. Buckley v. Althemeir, 2 F.R.D. 285, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1942); Schultz v. Mfrs. & Traders
Trust Co., 1 F.R.D. 53, 56 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
188. See Producers Releasing Corp. v. Pathe Indus., Inc., 10 F.R.D. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd
on other grounds , 184 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950) (counterclaim dismissed with leave to amend for
failure to identify whether defendant's claim based on common law or statutory fraud); Mfrs.
& Traders Trust Co., 1 F.R.D. at 56 (complaint dismissed apparently without leave to amend
as to certain defendants because it "failed to show any knowledge of fraudulent acts by any of
[those] defendants").
189. See, e.g., Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588, 591 (W.D. Pa.
1944); Macleod v. Cohen-Erichs Corp., 28 F. Supp. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); SEC v. Time-
trust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 41-42 (1939); Commentary, Requirement of Particularity in Pleading
Fraud, 6 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 739 (1943). Satirizing the practices of his day, 0. L.
Mc(askill, a leading critic of pleading under the federal rules, caustically wrote:
[it was sufficient to] draft a complaint claiming damages for fraud without indicat-
ing any detail. Whether [the plaintiff] was in fact defrauded will come out on the
trial. He is entitled to be heard on that. Under the modern philosophy we do our
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ness, and substantial justice. Usually this meant striking the balance in
favor of the pleader. 9 '
A short per curiam opinion issued in 1941 by a panel consisting of
Judges Learned Hand, Harrie Brigham Chase, and Charles Clark nicely
illustrates the drift of the early decisions.' 9 1 The case presented a com-
plaint which the court observed did not plead fraud with the desired
particularity. But it was, according to the court, "only a pleading," to
be construed to do "substantial justice" as directed by rule 8(f).' 9 2 Since
the pleading adequately informed the defendant of the basis of the
claim, the lack of specificity was not fatal: "Its general purport is plain
enough, and if the [defendant] had really any doubt about its mean-
ing-which plainly it had not-it had, and still has, relief under Rule
12(e); the day has passed when substantial interests stand or fall for
such insubstantial reasons."''
93
B. Denial Of Discove y
Despite the modest role the drafters envisioned for rule 9(b), a sub-
stantial body of contemporary case law treats it as a special pleading
rule that must be satisfied before discovery.'9 4 If the defendant makes a
successful 9(b) objection, all courts allow the plaintiff at least one oppor-
tunity to amend.9 5 But in those courts that require satisfaction of a
9(b) objection before discovery, the pleader is obligated to replead solely
investigating just before trial, or before motions for summary judgment or pretrial
hearing, if they are made.
McCaskill, Modern Philosophy of Pleading, supra note 41, at 126.
190. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Krejci, 123 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1941); Levenson v.
B. & M. Furniture Co., 120 F.2d 1009, 1009 (2d Cir. 1941); Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F.
Supp. at 591; United States v. Dittrich, 3 F.R.D. 475, 477 (E.D. Ky. 1943).
191. B. &M. Furniture Co., 120 F.2d at 1009.
192. Id. at 1009.
193. Id. at 1009-10.
194. Not surprisingly, those courts most adamant about enforcing rule 9(b) are, for the
most part, those most likely to deny discovery. Compare Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602,
606-09 (2d Cir. 1972), Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 492-94 (E.D. Mich. 1981), and
McFarland v. Memorex Corp. 493 F. Supp. 631, 639 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (finding complaint
insufficient and denying discovery), with Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 481-82 (E.D.
Pa. 1983), Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 725-26 (M.D.N.C. 1980), Denny v. Carey, 72
F.R.D. 574, 577-80 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F.
Supp. 673, 684-85 (N.D. Ind. 1966),cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (holding complaint suffi-
cient and indicating the desirability of affording the plaintiff discovery). In a recent decision
the Second Circuit has implied that less detail may be required where a complaint is chal-
lenged before the plaintiff is given discovery. See Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51,
57 (2d Cir. 1982).
195. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391, 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Kennedy v. Nicastro, 517 F. Supp. 1157, 1158, 1162 (N.E. Ill. 1981).
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on the basis of his own information. The right to amend without discov-
ery is often illusory."9 With discovery the plaintiff might be able to
particularize his allegations, but without it, it is far more probable that
he will be unable to satisfy the court's pleading demands.' 9 7
Different rationales have been offered to justify denying discovery.
A few courts have held that rule 9(b) is substantive.'9 8 So reasoning,
they have concluded that if the pleader fails to satisfy the rule he has
failed to plead a claim for relief,'9 9 The more common basis for denying
discovery is simply an unarticulated assumption that it is within the
court's discretion to police compliance with rule 9 by staying discovery
until the rule has been satisfied." ° In the view of these courts the plain-
tiff is required to have the details of his claim in hand when he files his
complaint.2 ' Uncertainty will not be countenanced.
The discretion to curtail discovery in this fashion is open to serious
question. As one commentator has said, the "pleader is not required to
allege only sure winners for which overwhelming admissible evidence is
in hand. '2 2 It is to be expected that every pleader will have some un-
certainty. All that is required is a reasonable belief that the claim can
be proved. 0 No penalties flow from the mere fact that the claim may
ultimately be proved untrue at trial.2 4 The nature of litigation is such
that, assuming a decision on the merits, one side's pleadings will always
196. See, e.g., Posner v. Coopers & Lybrand, 92 F.R.D. 765, 768-770 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd
mere., 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's complaint dismissed despite allegations that
plaintiff could not plead facts pertaining to scienter before discovery).
197. See supra note 150.
198. In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,157, at 95,584 (S.D. Cal. March 24, 1983) (9(b) has procedural and substantive aspects);
Decker, 517 F. Supp. at 494.
199. Decker, 517 F. Supp. at 494-95.
200. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1982); Brew v. Philips,
Appel & Walden, Inc., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,865, at 90,363
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1981).
201. "A plaintiff in a non-9(b) suit can sue now and discover later what his claim is, but a
Rule 9(b) claimant must know what his claim is when he files it." In re Commonwealth
Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1979); accord Sea-
board Corp., 677 F.2d at 1317; Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607-09 (2d Cir. 1972).
202. Risinger, supra note 149, at 56.
203. See supra note 155.
204. This is not entirely accurate. Costs are typically assessed against the losing party. See,
e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). A prevailing party will not, however, be allowed to foist every
expense of litigation on his adversary:
Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.
Any other practice would be too great a movement in the direction of some systems
of jurisprudence that are willing, if not indeed anxious, to allow litigation costs so
high as to discourage litigants from bringing lawsuits, no matter how meritorious
they might in good faith believe their claims to be.
Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
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be disproved. Yet no one experienced in litigation will doubt that in the
usual case both sides believe they can prevail and are convinced of the
truth of their position. The pleader and his adversary are entitled to
plead their cases, to develop them through discovery, and ultimately to
have a trial so long as they are proceeding honestly with a reasonable-
but not necessarily certain-belief that their claims can be proved.
That rules of discovery exist is proof that the pleader is entitled to
file a complaint with less than the information he will ultimately need to
prove his case. The rules regarding amendments,20 5 alternative plead-
ing,2"6 and joiner of multiple claims 20 7 and parties2 8 likewise demon-
strate that the pleader, even though uncertain of the parameters of his
suit, is entitled to file it. Collectively these rules provide a means of
handling the pleader's uncertainties and envision, through the right of
discovery, that he will be afforded an opportunity to investigate infor-
mation under the control of his adversary and uncooperative third par-
ties. Rule 9(b) tells us that something extra is required in pleading
fraud, but the terse directive that the "circumstances constituting fraud
• . . shall be stated with particularity" is too slender a reed to support a
litany of pleading rules undercutting both the right to discovery and the
flexibility in pleading that the federal rules otherwise envision.
C Dzsmissal
The burden placed upon pleaders who are denied discovery is a
serious problem. More alarming, however, is the increasing willingness
of courts to remedy a 9(b) objection through a dismissal with
prejudice. 20 9 There is a very real impediment to advancing fraud claims
in those courts that insist upon detailed allegations, deny discovery until
the detail is provided, and while granting the pleader leave to amend,
dismiss his complaint if his amended pleading does not provide the spec-
ificity the court demands. Dismissal under these circumstances is an
abuse of discretion.
Assuming a claim for relief has been pled so far as rule 8 is con-
cerned, and assuming that the court's orders are not being deliberately
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (under the "American Rule" prevailing party is
not ordinarily entitled to recover legal fees from the loser).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
206. Id. 8 (e)(2).
207. Id. 18(a).
208. Id. 20(a).
209. Eg., Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d Ill (2d Cir. 1982); Seaboard Corp., 677
F.2d at 1315; Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1978); Posner v. Coopers & Lybrand, 92
F.R.D. 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), afdmm., 697 F.2d 296 (2nd Cir. 1982).
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flouted,2 " dismissal for a reason unrelated to the merits is too severe: it
does not comport with the requirement in rule 8() that pleadings be
construed to do substantial justice.21 1 The Supreme Court's decisions in
C/us v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal 1 and Conley v. Gibson2 13 lend
support to this theme.
Conley v. Gibson21 4 is the Supreme Court's leading pronouncement
on the standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief. There
the Court deemed it "an accepted rule" that dismissal should not be
entered "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."2 5
Tested by this standard, an incomplete or obscure explication of the
pleader's claim would rarely, if ever, warrant dismissal. If, for example,
a complaint alleges that the plaintiff was defrauded through the sale to
him of worthless bonds, he has set forth a claim entitling him to relief.
A fraudulent sale of securities is plainly actionable, and if the plaintiff
can prove the elements of fraud, he is entitled to damages. But the ob-
jection to the plaintiffs complaint is not that a claim of fraud, even if
proved, would not suffice for relief. Instead, the argument is that the
fraud has not been adequately described. 2 6  There are thus two sepa-
rate inquiries: first, is the plaintiffs claim one that if proved would, on
some set of facts, entitle him to relief, and second, has the claim been
adequately described?
The Conley standard for dismissal does not address the disposition of
the second issue. Indeed, the Conley opinion acknowledged that the suf-
ficiency of the complaint is a separate problem. After stating that the
210. If the court directs the plaintiff to replead and he disregards the order, dismissal is
appropriate. See, e.g, Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1964) (complaint
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, & 1986 dismissed where plaintiff was ordered to replead and
failed to do so after 3 months).
211. Eg., Levenson v. B. & M. Furniture Co., 120 F.2d 1009, 1009 (2d Cir. 1941); Kauf-
man v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (D. Mass. 1982); Lynn v. Valentine, 19 F.R.D. 250,
254 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); In re Cassidy's Estate, 77 Ariz. 288, 296-98, 270 P.2d 1079, 1084-85
(1954).
212. 359 U.S. 231 (1959), rev'g, 253 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1958).
213. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 45-46.
216. Cf. the remarks of Judge Clark in chiding the judges of the Southern District of New
York for dismissing antitrust claims for lack of specificity:
From all this it is quite apparent that the real objection is not failure to state
a claim, for that is abundantly stated; it is rather the lack of detail which the defend-
ant seeks and the court thinks he should have. But this, where really needed, is to be
secured directly and simply by pretrial conference or discovery.
Clark, supra note 167, at 52.
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complaint did set forth a claim under the Railway Labor Act for relief
for racial discrimination, the Court noted:
The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to
set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of dis-
crimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The de-
cisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the
Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim"
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.2 17
The Conley opinion does not completely resolve the problem of fail-
ure to comply with rule 9(b), but when read together with Gls, it
strongly suggests that dismissal is not a proper remedy for curing a 9(b)
objection.2 18 In Glus the plaintiff sought to avoid the statute of limita-
tions by alleging that the defendant had misled him as to the time for
asserting his claim. The plaintiff claimed that as a result of the misrep-
resentations, the defendant was estopped to assert the limitations de-
fense. The defendant disputed the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations of
fraud.21 9 Citing Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court rejected the remedy
of dismissal even if the allegations were deficient:
It may well be that petitioner's complaint as now drawn is too
vague, but that is no ground for dismissing his action. [Citing
Conley]. His allegations are sufficient for the present. Whether
petitioner can in fact make out a case calling for application of
the doctrine of estoppel must await trial.22
0
D. Rule 11 As An Alternative Remedy
The obvious objection to denying the court authority to dismiss a
complaint that fails to particularize the fraud is that rule 9(b) will be
rendered unenforceable and thus eviscerated. This need not follow.
The pleader may, as indicated, be ordered to replead. 22 ' Regardless of
whether a litigant has the solace of knowing his pleading will not be
217. 355 U.S. at 47.
218. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate the Court is more willing to consider
dismissal in some types of cases. Cf, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
377-78 (1982) (remanding with directions to allow plaintiff to replead a factual basis for
standing but upon failure to do so, to dismiss); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (1977)
(indicating a vague or conclusory habeas corpus petition might be dismissed).
219. 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959), rev'g, 253 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1958).
220. 359 U.S. at 235.
221. See supra note 210.
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dismissed, such orders are coercive. Only the most intransigent litigant
will be undaunted by the prospect of explaining his noncompliance to
the court. In the exceptional case, when repleading fails to cure the
problem, rule 1122 offers further remedies. Rule 11 obligates counsel to
make a prefiling inquiry into the facts and law to ensure there is a rea-
sonable basis for the claims asserted. The court will not be able to assess
counsel's compliance with rule 11 at the pleading stage, for the same
reasons the undeveloped record cautions it not to judge the efficacy of
the plaintiffs claims from the pleadings. But as the record develops, the
absence of a reasonable basis for the claim may be indicated. If so, a
hearing inquiring into counsel's basis for asserting the claim would be
proper.2 23 Sanctions are authorized if appropriate.2 24
222. Effective August 1, 1983, FED. R. Civ. P. II was amended. The text of the rule is set
forth below (new material is italicized; deleted language is bracketed):
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his
pleading, motion, or otherpaper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifi-
cally provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by cor-
roborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney orparty consti-
tutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief [there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay]formedafler reasonable inquiy it is wellgrounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a goodfaih argument for the extension, modifcation,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessag delay or needless increase in the cost ofltigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. [or is signed with intent to
defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar
action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] If a pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a representedparty, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
223. For an example of this procedure, see Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 81 F.R.D.
418, 429-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
In determining whether a reasonable basis exists, the focus should be on the entire
claim for relief as opposed to its individual elements. Counsel may be uncertain about one or
more elements of the claim (e.g., the defendant's state of mind) and yet may have very sub-
stantial evidence of other elements - for instance, that the defendant misrepresented a fact,
that the plaintiff relied on it, that the fact was material and that the plaintiff was damaged as
a result of it. Viewing the claim and the information supporting it as a whole may provide a
credible, albeit circumstantial and somewhat uncertain, basis for believing the claim can be
proved with discovery. In such situations counsel should be deemed to have a reasonable
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There will undoubtedly be some plaintiffs who escape sanctions
and succeed in leveraging the threat of protracted litigation and bur-
densome discovery into the settlement of untenable claims. On the
other hand, if rule 1 1 sanctions are evenly and consistently applied, most
such claims will be deterred by the threat of the assessment of counsel
fees against the plaintiff. As the probability of penalties for filing vexa-
tious litigation becomes more certain, the incentive to proceed with such
suits should diminish.2 25
IV. CONCLUSION
A rule of added specificity in pleading fraud has been with us since
the common law. It deters glib fraud charges and facilitates the early
disposition of claims lacking merit. To this extent it is to be com-
mended. But enforcing a rule of specificity has its price. As the line is
drawn between legally sufficient and insufficient complaints, the re-
quirements for pleading become increasingly complex. Requirements
codified in the reported decisions engender a multiplicity of further re-
quirements in the minds of counsel. As the process develops the plead-
ings become increasingly important and the number of motions directed
at supposed defects in them ever increases. In the end whatever is
gained in eliminating baseless claims is offset by the unfortunate dismis-
basis for the claim, even though his presuit investigation has not provided him with informa-
tion supporting every element of it.
224. In its amended form rule 11 seeks to increase the use of sanctions. It provides that
where a pleading is signed in violation of the rule the court "shall impose... an appropriate
sanction. . . including a reasonable attorney's fee." The amended rule also makes plain that
fees may be assessed against the attorney, the client, or both. Attempts to invoke former rule
II as a basis for attorney's fees were generally unsuccessful. See, e.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620
F.2d 339, 349-350 (2d Cir. 1980) (reasoning that if attorneys' fees are a permissible sanction,
rule 11 requires a finding of bad faith i.e., that the action was without foundation); United
States v. Standard Oil, 603 F.2d 100, 103 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The rule says nothing about
disciplining a party by imposing attorney's fees upon him for any act of his lawyer, even if his
lawyer willfully violated Rule 11.").
225. Rule 11 should not become a general fulcrum for shifting the expense of litigation to
the losing party. The Advisory Committee cautions against an overzealous use of sanctions
that would deter the filing of potentially meritorious claims:
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories. The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom
of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable
to believe at the time the pleading, motion or other paper was submitted.
Advisory Committee note to amended Rule 11; see also Risinger supra note 149, at 52-60 (argu-
ing that to encourage potentially meritorious claims, the threshold for satisfying the "good
ground" requirement of former rule 11 should not be set too high); Ring, Penaltiesfor Filing
Suit, 7 TRIAL DIPL. J. 3 (1984) (arguing that broader use of sanctions would discourage free
access to the legal system).
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sal of meritorious claims and the escalating expense of handling plead-
ing objections.
The drafters of the federal rules were aware of the arguments for
and against special pleading. On the whole they resolved the matter in
favor of general pleading. Although a requirement of added particular-
ity was retained for fraud, the simplicity of the allegations in Form 13
and the format of the federal rules as a whole indicate that this was not
a substantial departure from the other pleading rules. Rule 9(b) must
be harmonized with rule 8(f)'s admonishment that the pleadings are to
be construed to do substantial justice. It must also be construed in the
spirit of flexibility suggested by the right to plead alternatively, to join
multiple parties and claims, and most importantly, to have discovery
and to amend following that discovery.
While there have undoubtedly been many frivolous securities
claims, attempting to deter such claims through specialized pleading
that is enforced through dismissal and denial of discovery is in conflict
with the intent and format of the federal scheme of pleading. Rule 11
now offers sufficient sanctions to deal with abusive claims; there is no
longer adequate justification for enforcing rule 9(b) sanctions.
Whatever merit that approach had is confined to the rigor of its own
precedent.
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